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Preferred Stockholder Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court held
that:
with respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that
distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of the
corporation and its directors is essentially contractual and the
scope of the duty is appropriately defined by reference to the
specific words evidencing that contract; where however the right
asserted is not to a preference as against the common stock but
rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of
such right and the scope of the correlative duty may be measured
by equitable as well as legal standards.'
Given that preferred stockholder preference rights are contractual in nature,
common stockholders' rights and director duties-as stockholders' agents-
depend on how the preference rights have been defined in the contract.2
Preferred stockholders are stockholders, after all, and have residual rights as
stockholders in addition to their preference rights.
This Article will examine the preferred stockholder rights by contrasting
the long established general rule concerning preferred stockholder rights with
the newer approach in the Jedwab case. This Article will provide an overview
of the Delaware Chancery Court decision in Jedwab and selected later
decisions by the Delaware courts. Section II will showcase background
information that led to the decision in Jedwab and later cases. Section III will
discuss the characteristics of preferred stock. Section IV will review the
Jedwab and the In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litgation3 opinions and will establish
how the Jedwab rule differs from the general rule of preferred stockholder
rights.4 The latter part of Section TV will discuss several criticisms of Jedwab
and various suggestions offered to justify the protection of preferred
stockholders' rights. Section V will discuss the Delaware courts' effort to
1. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
2. Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984).
3. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).
4. Compare Rothschild, 474 A.2d at 136 (stating the general rule that "[p]referential rights are
contractual in nature and therefore are governed by the express provisions of a company's
certificate of incorporation"), withJedwab, 509 A.2d at 594 (stating that some preferential
rights "may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards").
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reconcile the criticisms of the Jedwab opinion in the Trados opinion.. Section
VI will be devoted to the discussion of cases which reflect on the Delaware
courts' tendency for strict construction of the preferred rights in contracts.
Section VII will discuss the Delaware courts' current stance in terms of the
Jedwab rule by taking a look at the trend in recent cases. Finally, this Article
will discuss lessons from these recent cases that should be learned by lawyers,
as well as current and prospective preferred stockholders.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The distribution of corporate wealth underscores the continual tension
between common and preferred stockholders. The interests of the classes in
companies with two or more classes of stockholders may differ, potentially
pulling the directors in two separate directions.5 As a result, disputes arise on
many levels. But, as far as the decided cases are concerned, conflicts between
classes of stockholders typically arise under several scenarios. The following
examples demonstrate the most common of those situations.
First, in the event of a merger transaction, if the common is allocated an
unfair portion of the merger consideration relative to the preferred, the
preferred can bring suits against directors demanding fair distribution of the
merger proceeds. 6 These cases raise the issue of how a fair distribution
should be determined and the importance of procedural protections to
achieve that distribution.7
Second, if the preferred receives an unfairly large portion of the merger
proceeds, the common may bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the
directors.8  Complex transactional situations are typical in a distressed
economy-a struggling corporation considering a transaction that would
benefit certain preferred stockholders at the expense of the common-and
5. William Savitt, When Classes of Stockholders Clash, in GOING PRIVATE 2010: DOING THE
DEAL RIGHT, at 75, 77 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1796,
2010).
6. See Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986); In re FLS
Holdings, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993,
revisedApr. 21, 1993).
7. See In re FLS Hol&ngs, 1993 WL 104562, at *4-5.
8. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1 (Del. Ch. July
24, 2009).
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the job "of balancing duties to different equity classes can become a liability
minefield."9
Third, disputes also arise with regard to the preferred stockholder's
voting rights. The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) requires
voting in order for a corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation.10
Under Section 242(b)(2), if the preferences of any class of stockholders are
affected adversely, class voting of such stockholders is required." In order to
avoid this separate class voting requirement, a corporation will often
incorporate a wholly-owned subsidiary and merge itself into the subsidiary.12
As a result, the rights and preferences of the preferred stockholders in the
certificate of incorporation will be eliminated.'3
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF PREFERRED STOCKHOLDER RIGHTS
Professor Mitchell presents detailed explanations regarding the
characteristics of preferred stockholder rights.14 Moreover, in light of the
question of whether directors owe fiduciary duties to the preferred, he
explains conflicting arguments. 5
A. Preference Aspect
Professor Mitchell states that preferred stockholders have preference to
the extent that the rights created in the corporation's charter or certificate of
designation give them an advantage over common stockholders.16 According
to him, "[m]ost commonly, this advantage is recognized in the preferred's
priority to common stock upon liquidation, and in the right to receive
dividends."' 7 Since corporate wealth at any given point is limited, the
advantages of the preferred receive come at the expense of the common
stockholders. 8 No matter how wealthy a corporation is, such wealth cannot
9. Savitt, supra note 5.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1) (2009).
11. Id. § 242(b)(2).
12. Elliott Assocs., L.P v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 844 (Del. 1998).
13. Id.
14. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Pur.t.ing Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Whj We Should Care
About It), 51 Bus. LAW 443, 443-44 (1996).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 445.
17. Id. at 445-46.
18. Id. at 446.
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be available to both the common and the preferred at the same time."
Therefore, preferred and common stockholders are, to the extent of their
preference, in direct conflict with one another.20 Hence, the preference rights
are contractual in nature. 21
B. Stock Aspect
According to Professor Mlitchell, preferred stockholders are traditionally
regarded as having an ownership interest in the corporation. 22 Due to this
ownership interest, they represent a statutorily accepted corporate
constituency, and it is for their benefit that a corporation's officers and
directors must accomplish their duties.23  Under the proper conditions,
directors may owe a fiduciary duty to the preferred; therefore, the existence of
preference rights and the extent of the correlative duty may be calculated by
equitable and legal standards. 24
C. Peculiar Status of Preferred Stockholders vis-i-vis Common
Stockholders
In contrast to the directors' duty to maximize the value of the common, 25
the directors' basic duty to the preferred is to protect its investment.26 Due to
this status of the preferred stockholders, there arises the dispute of whether
and how the preferred stockholders' rights should be protected by the
directors. Basically, it is the matter of whether a fiduciary duty should be
owed in a particular situation to the preferred stockholders, or whether their
rights should be limited to their contractual rights. This is an ongoing
argument. According to Professor Mvitchell, to the extent of the preferences,
the preferred have priority over the common to receive their money, which is
typically a predetermined amount,27 but they cannot normally claim the
residual interest; as a result, the preferred tend to be more risk averse than the
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 445.
23. Id.
24. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
25. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 454.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 472.
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common stockholders. 28 Therefore, Professor Mitchell states, if a duty to the
preferred were imposed, management would become less willing to undertake
projects entailing some risk, despite their likelihood to yield higher expected
returns.29 This arguably would result in the ultimate inefficiency of our
corporate system30 because those transactions that might maximize gains for
the company would be avoided due to concerns resulting from the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care; therefore, such duties are considered important
obstructions to that maximizing goal.3'
Moreover, some have asserted that since preferred stockholders have the
opportunity to specify the terms of their rights relative to the common in
advance, the preferred stockholders should be held to the bargain they made
in the contract.32 According to Professor Mitchell, although the preferred
stockholders may not have been afforded the option to negotiate the terms of
the contract, they are also not obligated to buy preferred stock.33 Once they
choose to buy preferred stock, this argument maintains that they should not
seek more than what they bargained for later.34 Furthermore, Professor
Mitchell states that because the preferred have priority over the common to
receive their money, they take different financial risks relative to the
common. 35 This is said to justify adjustments to the relative fiduciary rights
of the common and the preferred.36
However, there remains an argument for a fiduciary duty to be owed to
the preferred as well. Professor Mitchell notes that the corporation has no
obligation to pay the preferred at all, leading to another way in which
preferred differs from creditors and other contractual claimants. 37 However,
he states that the preferred and common stockholders are similar in that they
are both equity participants in a corporation. 38 Thus, although preference
rights are contractual in nature, the preferred are closer to the common stock
than other contractual claimants, such as bondholders, in terms of the status
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Coporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595, 622
(1997).
32. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 470.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 471.
35. Id. at 472.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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they have in a corporation?9 Professor Mitchell states that courts obviously
recognize this, although never explicitly, as is evidenced by the decisions in
Jedwab and other cases acknowledging that some fiduciary rights are owed to
the preferred.40
IV. THE JED4WAB & TRADOS OPINIONS
In Jedwab, the court distinguished between circumstances in which a
matter relates to preference and circumstances where a right asserted is not a
preference right per se, as against the common stock, but rather a right shared
equally with the common.41 Recognizing the former situation as one where
the general rule is applicable, the Jedwab court thoroughly discussed the
situation where the right asserted is not a preference as against the common
stock, but rather a right shared equally with the common. 42
A. The Long Established General Rule
In Rothschild International Corp. v. Lsegett Group Inc., the court created a
general rule stating, "[p]referential rights are contractual in nature and
therefore are governed by the express provisions of a company's certificate of
incorporation."43 Section 151(a) of the DGCL allows Delaware corporations
to issue stock having such "special rights, and qualifications, limitations or
restrictions."44 In such instances where special rights are defined with regard
to the stock, "the law recognizes that the existence and extent of rights of
preferred stock must be determined by reference to the certificate of
incorporation, those rights being essentially contractual in nature."45
Therefore, the court indicates that preferred rights, being defined in the
contract, have a contractual nature. Recognizing this general rule as accepted
principle, 46 the Jedwab court stated that "with respect to matters relating to
preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred stock from common, the
duty of the corporation and its directors is essentially contractual and the
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
42. Id. at 594-600.
43. Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984).
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2009).
45. In re Sunstates Corp. S'holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 533 (Del. Ch. 2001).
46. Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 593.
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scope of the duty is appropriately defined by reference to the specific words
evidencing that contract." 47 Therefore, the court indicated that, because of
the contractual nature of the preferred rights, the scope of the correlative duty
on the part of the directors is limited to according the preferred stockholders
the rights that are determined by the specific words in the contract.
Therefore, the general rule is two-folded; the preferred stockholders' rights
are essentially contractual and therefore their rights and the director's
correlative duties are limited to the extent the preferred rights are defined in
the contract.
1. Rationale Based on the Wealth-Maximing Norm
The rationale supporting the general rule could be explained by answering
the questions of why the conflict arises and whose interest the directors
should favor. The first question to be asked is what brings about the conflict
between the common and the preferred. Preferred stockholders are preferred
because their preference right is created in the corporation's charter and gives
them advantages over common stockholders. 48 Given the limited quantity of
corporate wealth at any given point, these advantages come at the expense of
the common stockholders. 49 Therefore, conflict naturally arises from any
given distribution of corporate wealth at any given point in time due to the
corporate wealth's limited nature.
The next issue is whose interests the directors should favor. The
directors' basic duty to the preferred is to protect their investment.50 In
contrast, directors owe a duty to maximize the value of the common stock.5'
Since the preferred rights are treated as primarily contractual rights that come
at the expense of the common stockholders, 52 directors have to minimize the
value of the preferred in order to maximize the value of the common. 53
Therefore, it is argued that when there is a conflict between common
stockholders and preferred stockholders, directors should act in the interests
of the common stockholders. 54  The recent Trados opinion shows that
47. Id. at 594.
48. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 445.
49. Id. at 446.
50. Id. at 454.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 446.
53. Id. at 454.
54. Id. at 450.
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directors can be held responsible for breach of the duty of loyalty if they fail
to favor the common's interest in a conflict wherein the preferred
stockholders' interests diverge from those of the common stockholders.55
2. In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litzgation
The general rule states that the preferred rights, being contractual in
nature, are limited to those rights defined in the contract. Therefore, the
directors owe fiduciary duties to the preferred only to the extent the preferred
rights are articulated in the contract, and they have no need to further extend
preferred rights. Then, the next question arises if the directors opt to extend
preferred rights at the expense of the common. In 2009, the Delaware
Chancery Court in Trados addressed the issue of whether directors'
unnecessary favoritism of the interests of the preferred over the common
could constitute breach of duty of loyalty to the common.56
The Trados Shareholder Inc. Lizgation suit was brought by a former common
stockholder of Trados Incorporated, later a subsidiary of SDL, plc ("SDL"),
for breach of fiduciary duty.57 Of the $60 million contributed by SDL,
Trados preferred stockholders received approximately $52 million, with the
rest dispersed to the corporation's executive officers, pursuant to an approved
bonus plan.5 8 Trados common stockholders received nothing.5 9 Prior to the
merger, Trados received investments from venture capital firms and other
entities to better position itself for the possibility of going public.60 It is
typical for venture capital firms to make investments in the form of preferred
stock, especially convertible preferred. This gives the venture capital firms
the upside potential of common if things go well, and downside protection in
the form of liquidation preferences if things do not go well. The preferred
stockholders had four persons on Trados' seven-member board of directors. 61
Each member of Trados' board at the time of the approval of the merger was
named as a defendant.62
55. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24,
2009).
56. Id.
57. Id. at *1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Trados' board of directors began to discuss a prospective sale of the
company and formed a mergers and acquisitions committee to investigate a
sale or merger of Trados, consisting of three designees from the venture
capital firms and other entities. 63 Despite the company's markedly improved
financial condition, the merger was completed.64 The plaintiff asserted a
claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Trados'
common stockholders by approving the merger.65 Purportedly, it was not
necessary to sell Trados because it had become profitable.66 The plaintiff
maintained that the merger took place at the request of "certain preferred
stockholders that desired a transaction that would trigger their large
liquidation preference and allow them to exit their investment in Trados." 67
Further, the plaintiff argued, "in approving the Merger, the Director
Defendants never considered the interest of the common stockholders in
continuing Trados as a going concern, even though they were obliged to give
priority to that interest over the preferred stockholders' interest in exiting
their investment."68 It was alleged by the plaintiff that the directors favored
the preferred stockholders at the "expense of the common stockholders." 69
It was further alleged that the Trados board did not appropriately consider
what impact the merger would have on the common stockholders. 70
Particularly, the plaintiff asserted that, because the directors had been elected
on behalf of the preferred stockholders and had other associations with the
preferred stockholders, they could not exercise "disinterested and
independent business judgment."7' Also, it was alleged that two Trados
directors received material personal benefits due to the merger.72 Lastly, the
plaintiff alleged that SDL and its officers conspired with the directors of
Trados to postpone revenues until after the merger.73
The defendants argued, on the contrary, that the plaintiff "ignore[d] the
'obvious alignment' of the interest of the preferred and common stockholders
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *3-4.
65. Id. at *6.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *6.
69. Id. at *1.
70. Id. at *1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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in obtaining the highest price available." 74 Because the preferred stockholders
would not obtain their complete liquidation preference in the merger, they
too would benefit if a higher price were obtained.75  Essentially, the
defendants asserted that there was no conflict of interest between the
preferred and common stockholders when the defendants were pursuing the
highest price available for the corporation; therefore, the interests of the
preferred stockholders and the common stockholders did not diverge.76
Rather, the defendants maintained, the interests of the common and the
preferred were aligned with each other.
The issue in Trados was whether the directors breached their duty of
loyalty by "favoring the interests of the preferred stockholders over those of
the common stockholders."77 The conflict of interest situation arose when
the preferred stockholders' interests diverged from the interests of the
common stockholders because the directors proceeded with a merger that
was supposedly not necessary.78 The Trados court rejected the argument that
there was no conflict because the merger transaction was pursued for the
common stockholders as well as the preferred stockholders, and therefore the
directors' decision to go forward with the merger and allocate consideration
were protected under the business judgment rule.7 9
The Trados court started its analysis by recognizing the general rule that
preferred stockholders' rights are contractual in nature.80 Then, the court
acknowledged the Jedwab rule by stating that "[t]his Court has held that
directors owe fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders as well as common
stockholders where the right claimed by the preferred 'is not to a preference
as against the common stock but rather a right shared equally with the
common."' 81 However, the court recognized the situation in question was not
a Jedwab situation and proceeded with the reasoning in Equity-Linked Investors,
LP. v. Adams by stating:
Where this is not the case, however, "generally it will be the duty
of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to
74. Id. at *7.
75. Id. at *7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at *6.
79. See id. at *7.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
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prefer the interests of common stock-as the good faith
judgment of the board sees them to be-to the interests created
by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, where
there is a conflict."82
Therefore, the court concluded that "in circumstances where the interests
of the common stockholders diverge from those of the preferred
stockholders, it is possible that a director could breach her duty by improperly
favoring the interests of the preferred stockholders over those of the
common stockholders." 83 The court held that the allegations in the plaintiffs
complaint supported a "reasonable inference that the interests of the
preferred and common stockholders diverged with respect to the decision of
whether to pursue the merger."84 In light of this reasonable inference, the
court asserted that dismissal could be avoided if the well-pleaded facts of the
complaint showed that the director defendants were interested or lacked
independence in making this decision.85 The common stockholders claimed
the interests of the preferred stockholders diverged from those of the
common stockholders: while the preferred received a multi-million dollar
liquidation preference as a result of the merger, the common stockholders
reaped no such benefit. 86 The common stockholders further alleged it was
reasonable to infer the directors were interested in the transaction and thus
incapable of exercising independent business judgment since each "had an
ownership or employment relationship with an entity that owned Trados
preferred stock."87 Therefore, the court recognized that, since directors owe
fiduciary duties to the preferred only to the extent that the preferred's rights
were defined in the contract, it is possible that directors could be liable for a
breach of duty of loyalty to the common if they go further by favoring the
preferred over the common.88
It is noteworthy that the court did not suggest that this would necessarily
mean directors breach fiduciary duty by approving "a transaction that, as a
result of liquidation preferences, does not provide any consideration to the
82. Id. (quoting Equity-Linked Investors, LP. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
83. Id. (emphasis omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *8.
88. Id. at *7.
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common stockholders."89 The plaintiff was not entitled to relief simply by
"rebutting the presumption of the business judgment rule; rather, even if the
plaintiff ultimately rebuts the presumption of the rule, the burden shifts to the
director defendants to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction."90
Therefore, by using the word "possible," the Trados court indicated that the
court may not recognize this type of transaction as a breach of duty. That is,
if the directors can prove the entire fairness of the transaction favoring the
preferred over the common, it will not be considered as "improperly favoring
the interests of the preferred" and therefore there will be no breach of duty
on the part of directors to the common.9' Consequently, in order for the
directors to prove the entire fairness, the significance of a "careful process" is
emphasized.
3. Practical Implications of Trados
Since Trados was decided, a lot of attention has been given to this case
regarding the duties of the directors to several classes of stockholders. 92 It is
not surprising that the Trados decision attracted a good deal of attention,
especially from those lawyers who should protect the interests of their
preferred stockholder clients. According to one commentator, Trados offers
noteworthy guidance: 93 if directors were designated by a specific stakeholder,
they should avoid even the appearance of favoring those who appointed them
directors. 94 Rather, they should defend the interests of the corporation as a
whole.95 The Trados court acknowledged that even if a transaction that
benefits the preferred returns nothing to the common, it is not per se
improper.96 But Trados demonstrates that the directors must prove such a
transaction was entirely fair,97 resulting in a painstaking scrutiny.98
89. Id. at *7 n.36.
90. Id, at *9 n.56 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)).
91. Id. at *7.
92. See, e.g., Dennis J. White, Another View: To Sell or Not to Sell, N.Y Times DealBook,
Aug. 20, 2009, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/another-view-to-sell-or-
not-to-sell/.
93. Savitt, supra note 5, at 78.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *9 n.56 (Del. Ch. July
24, 2009) (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)).
98. Savitt, supra note 5, at 78.
5:377 (2011)390
Preferred Stockholder Rights
Therefore, the commentator asserts that directors who owe duties to
both the common and the preferred must take measures such as retention of
expert advisers or the establishment of independent committees in order to
"demonstrate deliberate decision-making in the best interests of the company
as a whole."9 9 According to him, after the Trados decision was rendered,
"[t]he need for [a] careful process" at every stage during the course of a
multiple-class transaction was emphasized. 00 It is worth noting that the
Trados case held that the "[p]laintiff is not entitled to relief merely by rebutting
the presumption of the business judgment rule; rather, even if the plaintiff
ultimately rebuts the presumption, the burden shifts to the director
defendants to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction."' 0'
Therefore, if there existed such a "careful process" with which the
directors can show "deliberate decision-making in the best interests of the
company as a whole," then the transaction favoring the preferred
stockholders will be considered to be entirely fair and therefore interests of
the preferred will be protected.102 The importance of "careful process" is
emphasized especially when private-equity sponsors and venture capital
funds, as they often do, place their employees as directors on company
boards. 03 In that case, because the preferred placed their employees on
company boards, it will be more difficult for the directors to prove the entire
fairness of the transaction favoring the preferred.
B. The Jedwab Approach
The Jedwab case relied on the rule that states, "where . . . the right asserted
is not to a preference as against the common stock but rather a right shared
equally with the common, the existence of such right and the scope of the
correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards."104
In Jedwab, contrary to the circumstances where the general rule is applicable,
the right asserted has not been defined as preference.105 When a right is not
defined as preference in the contract, the question becomes whether,
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. In re Trados Inc. S'holderlidig., 2009 WL 2225958, at *9 n.56 (citing Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)).
102. Savitt, supra note 5, at 78.
103. Id. at 78.
104. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
105. See id.
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according to the general rule, the preferred stockholders cannot have the
same right as common stockholders or whether they should share the right in
question equally with the common.106 After Jedwab is briefly overviewed,
analysis will continue with regard to the rationale of Jedwab, focusing on what
right, if any, is to be granted by directors to the preferred in a conflict with
the common for the purpose of this article.
1. Abstract of the Jeawab Case
Jedwab was a class action suit brought by the plaintiff who was a preferred
stockholder of MGM Grand, a Delaware corporation operating resort
hotels.107 The preferred class was created after the disastrous MGM Grand
fire in Las Vegas.108 The common stock fell in value, and MGM Grand
offered to exchange common for a new class of preferred which had
preference on dividends and liquidation, as well as certain redemption
features.109 The liquidation right was $20 a share.110 The redemptions were
to be at $20 a share, unless MGM Grand was able to purchase preferred
shares privately or on the market for a lower price, which it did.111 In any
event, MGM common stockholders who exchanged their common for the
new class of preferred likely did so thinking they would benefit financially
from the exchange, given the dividend preference, the liquidation preference,
and the redemptions available for the preferred. The defendant Kerkorian-
who was the majority common and preferred stockholder of MGM Grand-
was contemplating a merger with Bally Manufacturing.1 2 Under the terms of
the proposed merger, all classes of the MGM stock would be converted into
cash and holders of those stocks would be cashed out.113 The defendant, who
was taking an active role in the negotiations, agreed to vote for the merger,
which would guarantee the approval because the preferred stockholders had
no voting rights on the merger.114 Ultimately, after the merger of MGM
Grand with Bally, the public common stockholders (that is, the common
106. Seegeneraly id.
107. Id. at 586-87.
108. Id. at 588.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 587.
113. Id.
114. Id.
392 5:377 (2011)
Preferred Stockholder lghts
stockholders other than Mr. Kerkorian, who had a different deal), were to
receive $18 a share,"i5 whereas the preferred were to receive $14 a share.116
Clearly, the preferred stockholders were angered because their exchange of
common for preferred was turning out to be a bad deal under the terms of
the proposed merger. During the process, the board did not ask for advice as
to the fairness of the offer to the preferred from any legal counsel, financial
advisors or from a special committee, which had been created to evaluate the
fairness of an offer to the common.117 Seeking to enjoin the proposed
merger, the plaintiff brought the suit on behalf of all preferred stockholders
and moved for a preliminary injunction." 8
The issue in this case was whether the defendant, as a controlling
shareholder, breached a fiduciary duty to the preferred by proceeding with a
merger transaction whose terms would result in an allegedly unfair
apportionment of merger proceeds between the common and the
preferred.119 The argument advanced by plaintiff was that, since the directors
of a Delaware corporation owe a duty to approve a merger transaction only if
such merger allocates the merger proceeds fairly among the classes of its
stock, by not apportioning the merger consideration equally the directors
breached their fiduciary duty.120
The Court started its analysis by clarifying that plaintiffs theory is
premised upon the existence of a fiduciary duty on the part of the directors,
which is recognized in equity and if such premise is to be established, it will
require directors to treat shareholders fairly.121 In this case, the method by
which the merger consideration should be allocated among the two classes of
stockholders was not contractually determined. Therefore, when it came to
the merger consideration, there was no preference defined.122 With respect to
this, the court proposed that where the right asserted was not defined as a
preference in the contract, it is shared equally between preferred and common
stockholders and such right and ensuring duty of directors may be measured
by equitable and legal standards.123 Based on such reasoning, the court held
115. Id. at 590.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 587.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 591.
121. Id. at 593.
122. Id. at 596.
123. Id. at 594.
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that the plaintiffs claim to a fair allocation of the merger consideration
implicated fiduciary duties and therefore they should not be evaluated wholly
from the contractual analysis.124 The Jedwab court went on to explain that
determining fiduciary duties were owed to the preferred was only the first
step in the analysis.125 The next step was to determine whether the business
judgment rule or intrinsic fairness test should be applied.126 The court
determined that the more rigorous and burden shifting fairness test was
appropriate under the circumstances.1 27  Notwithstanding, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs would not likely succeed on the merits, even
under this test, as the allocation made was already a fair one.128 However, fair
allocation does not necessarily mean equal allocation.129  The court
determined such a proposition by holding that equitable right does not lead to
mathematically equal consideration.130 Consequently, although the preferred
was allocated $14 per share when the common was apportioned $18 per
share, the court held it was nonetheless a fair allocation.131
2. Does the Director Owe a Fiduciay Duty to the Preferred?
According to the Jedwab court, the first issue to be decided was whether
the directors owe any duty to the preferred stockholders other than the duty
with regard to the rights set forth for the preferred in the certificate.132 The
court pointed out that if a fiduciary duty that is recognized in equity on behalf
of preferred stockholders exists, this is the premise upon which plaintiffs
theory of liability depends.133 If such equitable duty does exist, then the
director and the controlling shareholders are required to treat all shareholders
(common and preferred) fairly.134 On the other hand, if there is no such duty
owed to preferred stockholders, plaintiff cannot proceed with its theories of
124. Id.
125. See id. at 593.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 584-85, 599-600.
128. Id. at 599-600.
129. Id. at 596-97.
130. Id. at 596.
131. Id. at 597.
132. Id. at 593.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
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liability because the premise cannot be established.135 "[A]nalogizing to the
wholly contractual rights of bondholders-as to which no 'fiduciary' duties
extend," the defendants argued that, due to the contractual nature of the
preferred rights, the only duties directors have to preferred stockholders are
those necessary to confer the preferred rights designated in their contract. 136
However, the court held that the preferred stockholder's claim to a fair
allocation of the merger consideration implicated fiduciary duties and thereby
it recognized, such premise being established, that the fiduciary duty should
be owed to the preferred by directors.137
Professor Mitchell elaborated on the issue of whether the director owes a
fiduciary duty to the preferred in great detail. According to him, fiduciary
duty "is imposed in situations of significant power disparity, where one party
is given responsibility and power over something that matters to another
party and that vulnerable party is at the mercy of the power-holding party."138
Professor Mitchell states that when the dominated party cedes power to the
power-holder, the power-holder undertakes responsibilities as well as
power.139 Therefore, the power-holder accepts a limitation on their power
and in so doing the dominated party is entitled to their fidelity.'1 The next
question becomes whether the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the preferred
and, if they do, what should be provided as a reason for the argument that
fiduciary rights should be owed to the preferred.141 Providing preferred
stockholders' vulnerability as a ground for the protection, Professor Mvitchell
explains the characteristics of the preferred stock in conjunction with such
vulnerability.142 First of all, according to him, unlike bondholders, preferred
stockholders have virtually no right to have their capital returned.143
Corporations typically retain the option to exercise redemptions, liquidations
rarely occur.144 Thus, the capital of the preferred stockholders is put
permanently at the sole discretion of the corporation's directors and thus is
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 594.
138. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 457-58.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Fletcher Int'l., Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., No. 5109-VCP, 2010 WL 2173838, at *7
(Del. Ch. May 28, 2010).
142. See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 461.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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entirely vulnerable to their decisions.145 Given the director's maximizing
obligations to the common stockholders, it is hard to expect the protections
for the preferred from them.146  According to Professor Mitchell, this
vulnerability provides grounds for a strong argument that meaningful
fiduciary rights should be owed to the preferred.147
Professor Mitchell next examines whether the preferred stockholders'
vulnerability could be ameliorated by the contract, concluding that it could
not be ameliorated for several reasons.148 The first reason advanced is that
the preferred are not the ones who draft the contract, but the issuer and its
underwriter draft it according to their own interests.149 Second, when the
contract is to be interpreted, the board stands in the "first line of
interpretation." 50 The court's tendency to interpret the contract narrowly
encourages the board to interpret the same way, which brings about the result
that the preferred are put in such a vulnerable situation where their legitimate
expectations will not be protected.151 Along with such vulnerability,
Professor Mitchell advances the status of the preferred as participants in the
enterprise in support of his argument.152 The preferred and the common
stockholders are similar in terms of their status in a corporation because they
are both participants in a corporation.153  Therefore, he concludes that
directors owe some meaningful fiduciary duties to the preferred.154
To the same effect, in HB Korenvaes Investments, LP. v. Marriott Cwp.,
Chancellor Allen noted that "it has been recognized that directors may owe
duties of loyalty and care to preferred stock" where a lack of contractual
rights places "the holder of preferred stock [in an] exposed and vulnerable
position vis a vis the board of directors . . . ."155 Further, the holder of
preferred stock is not one of the corporation's creditors, so has no recourse
to those protections either.156 The court additionally stated that "[s]uch a
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 473.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 472.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *5 (Del. Ch.
June 9, 1993).
156. Id.
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holder has no legal right to annual payments of interest, as long term creditors
will have, and most importantly [preferred stock] has no maturity date with its
prospect of capital repayment or remedies for default." 57
3. What Are the Rights of the Preferred?
As previously explained, the Jedwab court held that, "where ... the right
asserted is not to a preference as against the common stock but rather a right
shared equally with the common, the existence of such right and the scope of
the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal
standards."158 Therefore, the Jedwab rule has two aspects; one aspect is that
the preferred shares equally with the common when the right asserted is not a
preference. The other aspect is that in that case, equitable as well as legal
standards should be applied to determine the existence of such right and the
scope of the duty. Then, the question would be what rights the preferred
stockholder shares equally with the common. The Jedwab court held the point
that:
At common law and in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary all shares of stock are equal. Thus preferences and
limitations associated with preferred stock exist only by virtue of
an express provision (contractual in nature) creating such rights
or limitations. But absent negotiated provision conferring rights
on preference stock, it does not follow that no right exists. The
point may be conclusively demonstrated by two examples. If a
certificate designating rights, preferences, etc. of special stock
contains no provision dealing with voting rights or no provision
creating rights upon liquidation, it is not the fact that such stock
has no voting rights or no rights upon liquidation. Rather, in
such circumstances, the preferred stock has the same voting
rights as common stock.159
On its face, it looks like the preferred stockholder should have the exact
same rights as the common stockholder with respect to rights that were not
defined as preference. However, specifically what rights the preferred should
157. Id.
158. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
159. Id. at 593-94 (citations and emphasis omitted).
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have depends on what type of right is in question; whether the right is an
occasional specific right, or whether it is the right to share in corporate
wealth.
Where the right is an occasional specific right to be given to the
preferred,160 the preferred has the same right as the common. Jedwab depends
on the proposition that "[a]t common law and in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary all shares of stock are equal."'61 In Jedwab, the Chancellor
cited voting rights and rights upon liquidation as two examples to support the
court's opinion.162 And, he stated, where the contract is silent, preferred
stock get the same voting rights and the same rights to participate in the
liquidation of the corporation as common stock.163 Therefore, the preferred
has simply the same rights as the common.164 In contrast, if the right is one
for both preferred and common stockholders to share in the corporate
wealth, just because the preferred share the rights equally with the common
does not necessarily mean that the preferred are entitled to the equal
allocation of such corporate wealth with the common.165 For example, in the
event of allocation of merger consideration, as it was the case with the Jedwab
case, the preferred are entitled to the fair allocation of the merger
consideration, instead of equal allocation.166 It is because, based on the
court's proposition that "the existence of such right and the scope of the
correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards,"1 67
the court concluded that the plaintiffs claim to a fair allocation of merger
consideration implicated fiduciary duties.168
Notably, in light of a fiduciary duty being owed to the preferred,
Professor Brudney, citing the Jedwab decision, states that the argument for the
fiduciary duty was based on the theory that, the preferred stock being a stock,
preferred stockholders are the same as the common stockholders in a sense
160. See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 471.
161. Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 593 (citing Shanghai Power Co. v. Del. Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589 (Del.
Ch. 1974)). See also Stephen Bainbridge, Fiduciary Duties and Preferred Stockholders,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/08/fiduciary-
duties-and-preferred-stockholders.html (Aug. 26, 2009, 12:21 PDT).
162. See Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 593.
163. Id. at 593-94.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 596.
166. See id. at 596-97.
167. Id. at 594.
168. Id.
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that they are owners of the corporation.169 Therefore, management or
controlling stockholders owe fiduciary obligations to preferred stockholders
as well as to common stockholders.170 At least in matters that were not
defined in the contract, fiduciary duty on the part of management must be
incurred to the preferred stockholders; therefore, they should allocate at least
some of the economic interests to the preferred stockholders.171 According
to Professor Brudney, this leads to the suggestion in Jedwab that matters that
are not dealt with by the preferred stock contract be treated as matters with
regard to which the preferred stockholders enjoy "rights shared equally with
the common."172 Nevertheless, he points out that it is not clear whether the
equality guarantees that the preferred stockholders will be entitled to the same
consideration by the board which represents the common stockholders'
interests when it proceeds with transactions that have redistributive effects
between the common and the preferred.'73
However, he goes on to say that the essence of the arrangements between
preferred and common stock is that, while the preferred have priority of the
asset entitlements to the common and their rights are limited to such priority,
the common are allocated the residual interest and control.174 Therefore, with
the explicit provisions of the typical preferred stock contract allocating
returns and voting power, the preferred stockholders will be put in a much
closer position to the bondholders than that of owners.17s Accordingly, he
maintains, as it is the case with the bondholders, restricting the common
stockholders' opportunistic behavior through provisions based on the
traditional fiduciary notion is at odds with the parties' underlying
agreement. 76
C. Criticisms of the Jedwab Decision
The issue of whether directors should owe a fiduciary duty and what this
duty entails to the preferred is a hot button topic within the legal community.
As we have previously stated, the Jedwab court held that the directors owe a
169. Brudney, supra note 31, at 651.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 651-52.
175. Id. at 652.
176. Id.
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fiduciary duty to the preferred stockholders and therefore they should be
protected by the directors when it comes to the rights about which there was
no preference defined in the contract.177 In contrast, Professor Bainbridge
criticizes the Jedwab decision, arguing that a fiduciary duty for the preferred
should not be imposed upon directors. 78 Professor Bainbridge suggests that
the Jedwab case should be overturned on several grounds.179 He starts his
argument by characterizing the preferred stock and the documents governing
preferred stock. According to him, in contrast to bondholders who are
creditors of the corporation, holders of the preferred stock are nominally
shareholders.180 Bainbridge added the fact that, while bond indentures tend
to be long with highly detailed provisions, only the very basic affairs tend to
be covered by the documents governing preferred stock.181 It seems that his
characterization of the preferred stock as nominal shareholders undermines
the rationale of the Jedwab case, since preferred stock is stock, preferred
stockholders, like common stockholders are owners of the enterprise.182
Further, Professor Bainbridge recognizes that Jedwab depends on the
proposition that "[a]t common law and in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary all shares of stock are equal." 83 Therefore, even in the absence of
an agreement, preferred stock is conferred certain rights.184 He points out
that the Chancellor in Jedwab cited two such examples: where there are no
provisions governing voting rights and rights upon liquidation and where
preferred stocks get the same voting rights or the same rights to participate in
a liquidation as the common.185 Then, he concludes that neither of these
examples represent the proper situation for fiduciary obligation to be invoked
for preferred stockholders.'8 6 Moreover, he raises the objection that, from a
policy perspective, fiduciary obligation does not give a solution to potential
conflicts of interest between the holders of preferred and common.'87
Specifically, when it comes to the question of whose interests the board must
177. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del. Ch. 1986).
178. See Bainbridge, supra note 161.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Brudney, supra note 31, at 651.
183. Jedwab, v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citing Shanghai
Power Co. v. Del. Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589 (Del. Ch. 1974)).
184. Bainbridge, supra note 161.
185. Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 593-94.
186. Bainbridge, supra note 161.
187. Id.
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maximize when stockholders' interests diverge, the court holds that the
common must be favored over the preferred, but it seems to be only when or
with respect to which the preferred stockholders' preferences are defined in
the contract.188 In addition, he brings up the issue of fairness, the concept
that is notoriously difficult to specify. 89 According to him, the Jedwab
decision makes clear that the preferred are entitled only to a fair share in
merger consideration, not an equal one. 90 However, there remains the issue
of how the board decides what constitutes a fair share.191 Even if the board
makes a good faith effort to set a fair price, given the valuation is
indeterminable by its nature, reasonable people could still differ with regard
to the fair price.192 He wraps up his objection by stating that Jedwab implies
that greater rights may be granted to the preferred regarding nonpreference
than with respect to preferences, which may bring about odd results.193 Even
though Professor Bainbridge states no reason as to why he comes to this
conclusion, it might be because of the immeasurable nature of fairness that
comes into play when dealing with stockholder rights in general.
Furthermore, his result does seem odd because the contract did not define
nonpreference aspects with regards to the nonpreference, as opposed to the
fact that the contract dearly defined what the preference aspects were.
According to Professor Bainbridge, Jedwab sounds plausible, but proves
unpersuasive if closely examined. 194 He bases his opinion on a number of
Delaware Supreme Court cases, alleging that those cases suggest that all of the
rights of preferred stockholders are contractual in nature and those rights that
have a contractual nature are not related only to preferential rights.195 He
recognizes that in RGC International Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Cop., Vice
Chancellor Strine characterized Jedwab as an exception to the general rule
188. Id.
189. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 475.
190. Bainbridge, supra note 161.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Gale v. Bershad, No. 15714, 1998 WL 118022 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 1998)). In Gale,
Vice Chancellor Jacobs followed Jedwab by asking whether a preferred shareholder's right
to a fair valuation is contractual or whether it is "created not by virtue of any preference"
and is "shared equally with the Common." Gale, 1998 WL 118022 at *5.
194. Bainbridge, supra note 161.
195. See, e.g., Judah v. Del. Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628 (Del. 1977) ("Generally, the provisions
of the certificate of incorporation govern the rights of preferred shareholders, the
certificate ... being interpreted in accordance with the law of contracts, with only those
rights which are embodied in the certificate granted to preferred shareholders.").
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"that the rights of preferred stockholders are largely governed by contract law
and that corporate directors do not owe preferred stockholders the broad
fiduciary duties belonging to common stockholders."196 However, Professor
Bainbridge would consider Jedwab as an aberrational violation of the general
rule, not simply as a narrow exception to the general rule.197
D. Suggestions Concerning a Way to Protect Preferred Stockholders'
Rights
First of all, Professor Mitchell suggests that the preferred stockholders
should consider their contract as an exclusive source of their rights and that
they should not consider themselves stockholders at all.198 As an ultimate
solution, he suggests that a law should be put in place providing that some
duty should be imposed on corporate directors for preferred stockholders,
which may not happen anytime soon.199 Therefore, Professor Mitchell
suggests, as an interim solution, a covenant that prevents the corporation
from defeating the preferred stockholders' legitimate expectations. 200 In the
situation where such provisions are used, those provisions would empower
the preferred stockholder to block transactions designed to transfer their
wealth gratuitously to common stockholders. 201 Due to such a covenant, the
resulting effect would be the incorporation of the fiduciary notion into the
preferred stock provisions of the certificate of incorporation. 202 However,
Professor Mitchell concludes that the interim solution may not be perfect.203
The reason for his concern is it may not give enough protection for the public
preferred stockholders who most need fiduciary protection since they may
not be given the opportunity to negotiate for such a provision.204
In stark contrast, Professor Bainbridge suggests that in the absence of a
contract provision that covers the rights asserted by the preferred, as it is
analogous to the bond setting, an implied covenant of good faith should be
196. RGC Int'l Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., No. 17674, 2000 WL 1706728, at *16
(Del. Ch. Nov 8, 2000).
197. See Bainbridge, supra note 161178.
198. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 444.
199. Id. at 476.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 477.
204. See id.
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the solution, rather than fiduciary duties. 205 Professor Bainbridge points out
that since bond indentures tend to be hundreds pages long, they cover almost
all conceivable events.206 In contrast, certificates of designation governing
preferred stock tend to be relatively short only covering a few issues.207
According to him, it raises the question of "how [to] deal with issues that
come up that the contract does not cover[.]" 208 He maintains that using an
implied covenant of good faith, instead of fiduciary duties, would be the
solution, as it is used in bond setting.209 With such a covenant, the preferred
would be protected from the board who may try to deprive them of the
benefit of their bargain.210 And Bainbridge goes on to say that to the extent
that even the covenant cannot provide protections, the preferred
stockholders should protect themselves by diversifying portfolios. 211
However, according to Professor Mitchell, the purpose of the good faith
doctrine is limited to protect one party's legitimate expectations from the
contract by preventing the other party in the contract from opportunistically
taking advantage of the ambiguities of terms.212 Contractual good faith has
been recognized as a very narrow doctrine and its substance should be drawn
from the explicit terms of contract itself.213 Thus, this doctrine is applied only
when "implied good faith terms [are] consistent with the explicit terms of the
agreement itself and must further the parties' performance of that explicit
agreement." 214 According to Professor Mvitchell, one court made it clear that
the doctrine is applied narrowly and with a very limited function: '"[w]here
plaintiffs' contractual rights have not been violated, there can have been no
breach of an implied covenant."' 215 Thus, in order for the implied covenant
of good faith doctrine to be applied, there must be an initial breach of
contract.216  Given that contractual good faith has been applied in the
205. Bainbridge, supra note 161.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 456.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673
(S.D.N.Y 1984), vacated on other grounds, 754 E2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985)).
216. Id.
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corporate finance context as a very narrow doctrine, invoking the doctrine of
the covenant of good faith may not be helpful.
V. RECONCILIATION OF TRADOSWITHJEDWAB
In In re FLS Holdings, Inc. Shareholders Litgation, the Delaware Chancery
Court discussed the issue of fair allocation of merger consideration, which
was the same issue that the Jedwab case addressed.217 The question before the
court was whether the procedural protection for the preferred during the
course of the allocation of the merger consideration existed to make such
allocation fair.218 In LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, which was decided
in 2010, the court addressed the issue of whether directors "owed the
preferred a fiduciary duty to accord it more than it was contractually entitled
to receive by right in a merger."219 Further, the court examined whether the
directors' distribution of more proceeds than preferred stockholders were
guaranteed by the certificate would contradict its decision in Equity-Linked
Investors, cited in the Trados opinion.220 Also, in an effort to reconcile Jedwab
and FLS Holdings with Trados, the court distinguished between the situation
where Jedwab and FLS Holdings apply and the one in which Trados is
applicable. 221 As a result, this case clarified the current standing of Delaware
law with regard to preferred stockholder rights.
A. In re FLS Holdings, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
The FLS Holdings case discussed what mechanism employed satisfies the
procedural protections or safeguards for the preferred stockholders so that
the distribution of the merger consideration can be considered fair.2 22 An
order was sought under Chancery Court Rule 23 to approve the settlement
and dismissal of some stockholder class action suits. 223 The class action was
217. See In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2,
1993, revised Apr. 21, 1993).
218. See id. at *1.
219. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del Ch. 2010) (emphasis
omitted).
220. See id. at 445-46.
221. See id. at 447.
222. See In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 2, 1993, revised Apr. 21, 1993).
223. Id.
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brought by the preferred stockholders of FLS Holdings.224 The claim
asserted on behalf of the preferred stockholders against the directors of FLS
Holdings was that the merger proceeds negotiated with Kyoei was not fairly
distributed between the preferred and common stockholders of FLS.2 25 Only
those directors who either owned large amounts of common stock, or were
affiliates of Goldman Sachs and Citicorp, represented FLS Holdings in its
negotiations with Kyoei.226  There were no independent advisers, and no
independent directors' committee was appointed to represent the interests of
the preferred stockholders, which were in direct conflict with the common
stockholders. 227 The preferred stockholders did not hold voting rights in the
transaction or in the allocation. 228 Salomon Brothers, Inc.-which was hired
by FLS to determine whether the merger agreement was fair-issued an
opinion after the merger had been consummated, concluding that the
distribution was fair to the preferred.229
The court recognized that "[i]n allocating the consideration of this
merger, the directors, although they were elected by the common stock, owed
fiduciary duties to both the preferred and common stockholders, and were
obligated to treat the preferred fairly." 230 The court further stated that this
somewhat opaque standard "may require a reviewing agency to make a highly
specific inquiry of the company and the transaction," unless procedures are in
place that are sufficient to give reasonable guarantees of fairness. 231
Therefore, the issue addressed by the court was whether the procedural
protections or safeguards for the preferred stockholders were lacking and the
allocation in the merger agreement was not fair.232 The court recognized that,
in order for the fair allocation to be warranted, there must be a mechanism
employing a "truly independent agency" on the behalf of the preferred
"before" the transaction was completed.233 However, in this case, the court
held that, "[o]nly the relatively weak procedural protection of an investment
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *4.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. See also Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987);
Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del. Ch. 1986).
231. In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr.
2, 1993, revised Apr. 21, 1993).
232. Id.
233. Id. at *5.
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banker's ex post opinion was available to support the position that the final
allocation was fair."234 The court held that anyone who seeks a court order to
settle and dismiss claims of class members must abide by the burden to
demonstrate that the anticipated settlement is a fair compromise and
embodies ample compensation for the claims to be discharged.235 Even
though an opinion was issued by plaintiffs expert after the merger agreement
had been signed concluding that the allocation was fair to the preferred, the
court held that those opinions "would not substantially assist in satisfying
defendants' burden of showing that the allocation was fair."236 The court
concluded that the supporters of the settlement had not reached their burden
and there was a substantial issue that was reasonably litigable.237 Accordingly,
the court denied the defendants' motion.238
Therefore, in FLS Holdings, the court maintained that the early
employment of a "truly independent agency" was crucial in determining
whether allocation of merger proceeds was fair.239 Therefore, if a "truly
independent agency" is lacking or if the opinion as to the fairness of the
distribution is issued "after" a transaction is completed, then the allocation
will not be considered fair. Professor Bainbridge has criticized the Jedwab
decision by stating that, even after the Jedwab decision, there remains the
question of how the board should decide what is fair ex ante.240 In this
regard, FLS Holdings would give the preferred as well as the directors some
guidance as to the matter that Jedwab did not clarify, which is how to
demonstrate fair allocation.
B. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v.James
In this 2010 case, the plaintiff was LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd., a
preferred holder of QuadraMed which sought to enjoin the acquisition by
defendant Francisco Partners of QuadraMed.241 The plaintiff felt the
consideration that was to be given to the preferred holders of QuadraMed did
234. Id.
235. Id. at *1. See Barkan v Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1285-86 (Del. 1989).
236. In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *5. (Del. Ch.
Apr. 2, 1993, revisedApr. 21, 1993).
237. Id.
238. Id. at *6.
239. Id. at *5.
240. See Bainbridge, supra note 161.
241. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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not surpass the 'as if converted' value the preferred were contractually
entitled to demand in the event of a merger."242 The "as if converted" value,
which was based on a formula in the certificate of designation, gave the
preferred stockholders "the bottom line right to convert into common at a
specified ratio . . . and then receive the same consideration as the common in
the [m]erger." 243 In order to value the preferred stock, the merging parties
decided to "cash out the preferred stock at the price the preferred
stockholders would receive if they exercise[d] their right to convert to
common stock."244 The QuadraMed board of directors created a special
committee of independent directors to assess the various incoming bids.245
Except for one member, who held over 650,000 shares of QuadraMed
common stock, the special committee members owned a nominal amount of
QuadraMed shares. 246 The court held that the special committee carefully
considered the duties it owed to both the common and preferred
stockholders when it made its decision.2 47 The preferred stockholders sought
to enjoin the merger arguing the directors breached fiduciary duty owed to
them.248
The preferred stockholders' complaint was based on the theory that the
directors owed a duty to distribute more merger proceeds to the preferred
than the preferred could demand as an entitlement under the certificate. 249
Therefore, the issue was whether directors owed the preferred "a fiduciary
duty to accord it more than it was contractually entitled to receive by right in
a merger."250 Another issue was whether the directors' allocation of more
proceeds than preferred stockholders were guaranteed by the certificate
would contradict with the Equity-Linked Investors rationale that was cited in the
Trados case.251
The preferred stockholders argued that the directors would breach their
fiduciary duty to them if more of the merger consideration was not allocated
them.2 52 This argument was made based on a certain contractual rights that
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 439.
245. Id. at 442.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 443.
248. Id. at 438.
249. Id. at 450-51.
250. Id. at 438 (emphasis omitted).
251. Id. at 447.
252. Id. at 438.
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the preferred had if a merger did not happen.253 Based on this supposed
breach of fiduciary duty, the preferred stockholders sought to enjoin the
merger.254 Believing that merger consideration given to them was not
enough, the preferred asserted that the distribution of the merger
consideration between the preferred and the common was unfair because the
directors disbursed the merger consideration to the preferred on an "as if
converted" basis.255 The preferred believed it minimized the value of their
stock.
The preferred stockholders, pointing to the decisions of the Delaware
Chancery Court in Jedwab and in FLS Holdings "argue[d] that the QuadraMed
board had the duty to make a 'fair' allocation of the Merger consideration
between the common and preferred stockholders." 256 In order to warrant
fairness in doing this, the preferred stockholders argued that the board was
required to set up some type of negotiating agent, which would owe a duty
and exercise discretion on behalf of the preferred stockholders during the
course of the allocation process. 257 They argued that is more so in this case
because, when the directors own common stock and do not own preferred
stock, the fair balance between the interests of the preferred and their own
interest is more problematic. 258
By contrast, the defendants argued that the QuadraMed board released
themselves from any fiduciary duty because it allocated the percentage of
value equivalent to the preferred's "bottom line right, in the event of a
merger, to convert and receive the same consideration as the common." 259
On the basis "that the preferred stockholders had no contractual right to
impede, vote upon, or receive consideration higher than the common
stockholders in the [m]erger," defendants argued "that the Board's decision to
accord them the value that the preferred were entitled to contractually
demand in the event of a merger cannot be seen as unfair." 260 Therefore, the
defendants maintained that "because the QuadraMed Board honored all
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 439.
256. Id. at 445. See also Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986);
In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr.
2, 1993, revisedApr. 21, 1993).
257. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 445 (Del. Ch. 2010).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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contractual rights belonging to the preferred, . . . it was the duty of the Board
not to go further and bestow largesse on the preferred stock at the expense of
the common stock."261 In support of their argument, the defendants cited the
proposition from Trados and Equity-Linked Investors that "it was the Board's
duty, once it had ensured treatment of the preferred in accord with their
contractual rights, to act in the best interests of the common."262 Further,
acknowledging that, because of the simple fact that directors own common
stock and no preferred stock, under certain circumstances, directors might be
found to be "interested" in a transaction.263 But, the defendants argued this
would not be that type of circumstance.264 Since four of the "[s]pecial
[c]ommittee members own very modest common stock stakes, this would
reduce those [s]pecial [c]ommittee members' [m]erger take by, at most, several
thousand dollars, an amount the preferred stockholders have done nothing to
show is material to these directors." 265
The court started its analysis by considering two cases cited by the
plaintiff: the FLS Holdings and the Jedwab cases.266 The court admitted that in
FLS Holdings, Chancellor Allen stated that without any contractual provision,
a mechanism employing a truly independent agency on behalf of the preferred
is required in order for a fair allocation to be warranted in a conflict between
the common and the preferred.267 Also, the Court admitted that "in Jedwab,
Chancellor Allen said that directors owe preferred stockholders a fiduciary
duty to 'exercise appropriate care in negotiating [a] proposed merger' in order
to ensure that preferred shareholders receive their 'fair allocation of the
proceeds of [a] merger.' 268
By contrast Trados, one of the two cases cited by the defendant (another
case being Equiy-Linked Investors, which was cited in the Trados case),269 stated
that the rights and preferences of preferred stock are contractual in nature,
and that, "in circumstances where the interests of the common stockholders
diverge from those of the preferred stockholders, it is possible that a director
could breach her duty by improperly favoring the interests of the preferred
261. Id.
262. Id. at 445-46.
263. Id. at 446.
264. Id. at 446.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. (alterations in original) (quotingJedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584,
594 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
269. Id. at 445.
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stockholders over those of the common stockholders." 270 After considering
all of these cases, the court made a distinction between a situation where
contractual terms were absent and one where contractual provisions
existed. 271 Based on this distinction, the court recognized that, in FLS
Holdings and Jedwab, there was no objective contractual basis upon which the
board could allocate the merger proceeds between the preferred and the
common. However, in this case, there existed one: the conversion
mechanism. 272 Therefore, the court recognized that this case was different
from FLS Holdings and the Jedwab because, unlike both cases, here there was
an objective contractual basis for treatment of the preferred.
At this point, the court investigated whether the decisions by Chancellor
Allen, who authored both Jedwab and Equity-Linked Investors, were
contradictory to Trados.273 Answering the question by stating that they were
not inconsistent when Chancellor Allen's opinion in HB Korenvaes Investments,
LP. v. Marriott Cop is considered, the court further examined Korenvaes case.
In that case, "a board took very aggressive action that was, objectively
speaking, adverse to the interest of the preferred."274 The board of Marriott
"agreed to a transaction that issued a large special dividend ... to the
common stock and indefinitely suspended dividends on the preferred
stock." 275 The preferred stockholders then sought to enjoin the payment of
the special dividend, arguing that Marriott's directors "breached their fiduciary
duties to the preferred stockholders by agreeing to the transaction." 276
Rejecting that argument, Chancellor Allen held that even if the board had
acted in order to benefit the common by taking extremely aggressive action
that was adverse to the interests of the preferred, it did not constitute breach
of the duty of loyalty.277
The court went on to state the analysis of Chancellor Allen in Korenvaes
decision.278  Chancellor Allen manifested the contractual nature of the
preferred right by stating that "[r]ights of preferred stock are primarily but not
270. Id. at 447.
271. Id. at 449.
272. Id. at 446-47.
273. Id. at 447.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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exclusively contractual in nature." 279 Then, he ascertained that 'it has been
recognized that directors may owe duties of loyalty and care to preferred
stock' where a lack of contractual rights renders 'the holder of preferred stock
[in an] exposed and vulnerable position vis-a-vis the board of directors."' 280
According to him, "the question whether duties of loyalties are implicated by
corporate action affecting preferred stock" is a question to which the answer
depends on the particularities of context.281 Chancellor Allen then pointed
out that "the fact that the certificate of designation considered the possibility
of an in-kind dividend and gave the preferred certain rights in that context
was dispositive of whether there was any fiduciary duty claim."282 Therefore,
Chancellor Allen recognized that if the preferred rights were articulated in the
contract in a specific context, then the preferred did not have a fiduciary duty
claim. And, he went on to state:
Most important . . . is the fact that the certificate of designation
expressly contemplates the payment of a special dividend of the
type here involved and supplies a device to protect the preferred
stockholders in the event such a dividend is paid ....
[Therefore,] the legal obligation of the corporation to the Series
A Preferred Stock upon the declaration and payment of an in-
kind dividend of securities has been expressly treated and rights
created.283
Consequently, Chancellor Allen acknowledged that when the preferred
right was expressly contemplated in the contract, the legal duties on the part
of the directors are limited to such extent and therefore the preferred cannot
bring a fiduciary duty claim. Therefore, the Chancery court determined the
reasoning of Chancellor Allen in Korenvaes reconciles the doctrine. 284
279. Id. (quoting HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at
*5 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993)).
280. Id. at 448 (alteration in original) (quoting HB Korenvaes Invs., L.E v. Marriott Corp., No.
12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993)).
281. Id. (quoting HB Korenvaes Invs., L.E v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at
*6 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993)).
282. Id. (citing HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *7
(Del. Ch. June 9, 1993)).
283. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HB Korenvaes Invs., L.E v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922,
1993 WL 205040, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993)).
284. Id.
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In support of the conclusion that the Chancellor Allen's Jedwab opinion is
not inconsistent with Trados, the court presented the following proposition
and thereby reconciled the situation where Trados applies with the one where
Jedwab and FLS Holdings apply.
When, by contract, the rights of the preferred in a particular
transactional context are articulated, it is those rights that the
board must honor. To the extent that the board does so, it need
not go further and extend some unspecified fiduciary
beneficence on the preferred at the expense of the common.
When, however, as in Jedwab and PLS Holdings, there is no
objective contractual basis for treatment of the preferred, then
the board must act as a gap-filling agency and do its best to fairly
reconcile the competing interests of the common and
preferred.285
The first half of the proposition ascertained the general rule by stating
that, because the rights of the preferred, if articulated by contract, are
essentially contractual, the preferred are limited to those rights. Since the
directors owe fiduciary duties to the preferred only to the extent that the
preferred rights are defined in the contract, the directors do not need to
extend preferred rights. Then, the question becomes what result will ensue if
directors do go further and extend the preferred rights at the expense of the
common anyway. This was the issue the Trados court addressed and, in brief,
the court recognized that directors should not go further by extending the
preferred rights at the expense of the common, unless the directors can prove
the entire fairness of the transaction favoring the preferred over the
common. 286 Therefore, Trados is consistent in this regard with Korenvaes,
which held that the preferred could not bring a fiduciary duty claim if the
preferred right was articulated in the contract. It is because, in both cases, the
court did not allow the preferred either to pursue or to be accorded by
directors "more than it was contractually entitled to receive by right." 287
Consequently, the court ascertained that both Trados and Korenvaes are
285. Id. at 448-49.
286. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *9 n.56 (Del. Ch. July
24, 2009).
287. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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applicable to the situation where there is a provision governing preferred
rights in the contract.
In contrast, as the second half of the proposition, the court
acknowledged that, as in the Jedwab and FLY Holdings, where there is no
provision governing the preferred rights, the director, acting as an agent, owes
a fiduciary duty to the preferred and should treat the preferred fairly to fill the
gap in light of the terms of the contract.
Consequently, by contrasting Trados with Jedwab, the court differentiated
the situation where Trados applies from the one where Jedwab applies.
Essentially, in order for there to be a contradiction, two rationales must be
applicable to the same situation. But, here, the court recognized that the
rationales of Trados and Jedwab were not. Rather, those two rationales apply to
completely different situations; Trados applies when there exist provisions
governing the preferred rights, whereas the Jedwab applies when such
provisions do not exist. Therefore, the court concluded that Trados and
Jedwab do not conflict with each other.
After acknowledging that Jedwab and Trados are not inconsistent, the court
concluded that the situation in question is closer to Korenvaes, which falls
within the general rule category, than it is to Jedwab.288 That is because, based
on the distinction previously made by the court, in this case, unlike in Jedwab
and FLS Holdings, there was an objective contractual basis for treatment of
the preferred.289 And, on such basis, the preferred have right to receive the
same consideration they would have received if they had converted their
shares according to the formula in the certificate.290
Further, the court examined whether the directors' allocation of
additional value to the preferred would contradict with reasoning in Equiy-
Linked Investors, which was cited in the Trados case.291 The court recognized
that, since the preferred rights were articulated plainly and their rights were
limited to them, the directors owed no duty to the preferred to go further and
allocate additional value to the preferred. It went on to say that, if directors
go further, it would be inconsistent with Chancellor Allen's reasoning in
Equiy-Linked Investors:
288. Id. at 449.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
5:377 (2011) 413
Virginia Law & Business Review
While the board in these circumstances could have made a
different business judgment, . . . it violated no duty owed to the
preferred in not doing so. The special protections offered to the
preferred are contractual in nature. The corporation is, of
course, required to respect those legal rights. But ... generally it
will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to
be exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock as the good
faith judgment of the board sees them to be to the interests
created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock,
where there is a conflict.292
Therefore, it can be inferred that if directors go further and extend some
unspecified fiduciary beneficence on the preferred at the expense of the
common, under the Trados rationale, "it is possible that a director could breach
her duty by improperly favoring the interests of the preferred stockholders
over those of the common stockholders." 293
In conclusion, recognizing that the certificate of designations in question
"does provide the preferred with a contractual right to certain treatment in a
merger," the court held that "a board of directors that allocates consideration
in a manner fully consistent with the bottom-line contractual rights of the
preferred need not . . . do more." 294 Therefore, the court held that the
directors acted equitably toward the preferred because they treated the
preferred entirely consistently with the conversion formula the preferred
bargained for in the certificate.. 295 Consequently, the court recognized that the
directors did not owe the preferred a fiduciary duty to accord it more than it
was contractually entitled to receive by right in a merger.296 Rather, the court
determined that the directors have a duty to prefer the interests of the
common where there is a conflict.297 Therefore, the court held that the
preferred had not established a reasonable probability of success on the
292. Id. at 449 (citing Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del.
Ch.1997)).
293. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24,
2009).
294. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del. Ch. 2010).
295. Id. at 438-39.
296. See id. at 449.
297. Id. at 449 (citing Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del.
Ch.1997)).
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merits of their fiduciary duty claim; thus, their preliminary injunction was
denied.298
Notably, the court delineated a gap-filling duty that is recognized when
there is "no objective contractual basis for treatment of the preferred," as in
Jedwab and FLS Holdings.299 The court acknowledged that, under the DGCL,
directors may have gap-filling duties in the event that there is not an objective
basis to apportion consideration between the preferred and common in a
merger event.300 Also, the court stated that without an objective contractual
basis, the only protection for the preferred is for the directors to find a way to
fairly fill the gap left by incomplete terms of the contract, as they are
fiduciaries who sold their shares to the preferred.301 Otherwise, the preferred
would be entirely vulnerable and subject to arbitrary treatment in a merger
situation.302 Therefore, the court held that "when, . . . as in Jedwab and FLS
Holdings, there is no objective contractual basis for treatment of the preferred,
then the board must act as a gap-filling agency and do its best to fairly
reconcile the competing interests of the common and preferred."303
VI. DELAWARE'S STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE RIGHTS
The general rule manifests that the rights of preferred stock are essentially
contractual and the scope of the correlative duty on the part of the directors
is determined by the specific words in the contract.304 Therefore, the general
rule implicitly instructs the preferred to have their rights articulated in the
contract in order to protect them.
"[P]referred shareholder[] rights are defined in either the corporation's
certificate of incorporation or in the certificate of designation, which acts as
an amendment to a certificate of incorporation." 305  Since the rights of
preferred shareholders are primarily contractual in nature, the "'construction
of preferred stock provisions are matters of contract interpretation for the
courts."' 306 In that regard, Professor Mlitchell stated that the courts rendered
298. Id. at 439.
299. Id. at 449.
300. Id. at 449.
301. Id. at 447.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 449.
304. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
305. In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 2009).
306. Id. (quoting Matulich v Aegis Commc'ns Group, Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008)).
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decisions in a manner where it was indisputably clear that the preferred stock
contract is construed literally, or at least rather narrowly.307 The following
cases demonstrate the tendency of Delaware courts toward strict construction
when it comes to the interpretation of the preferred stock contract.
A. In re Sunstates Corp. Shareholder Litigation
In In re Sunstates Cop. Shareholder Litigation, the Delaware Court of
Chancery held, in applying principles of contract interpretation, that the rights
of a preferred stockholder as set forth in the certificate must be construed
strictly.308 The court recognized that, in certain circumstances, the strict
construction of the terms may permit the directors to avoid a restriction
through the agency of its subsidiaries. 309 Although such literal interpretation
would cause the protective provision of the charter to be rendered "nugatory
and illusory," strict construction controls. 310
In Sunstates, one of the corporation's preferred stockholders brought a
class action suit based on the claim that Sunstates violated its certificate of
incorporation by repurchasing shares when it was in arrears on the preferred
stock dividend.311 The defendants moved for summary judgment on this
claim, arguing that the special limitation in the charter should not apply
because Sunstates, itself, made no share repurchases.312 Rather, one or more
of Sunstates' subsidiary corporations were responsible for purchasing all
reacquired shares.313  As the Sunstates certificate does not specify that
repurchases by subsidiaries are to be prohibited when the parent is in arrears
on its preferred stock dividend, Sunstates argued it was entitled to judgment
in their favor as a matter of law.314 Therefore, the issue was whether a
subsidiary can properly repurchase shares when the charter merely stipulates
that the defendant-parent company cannot purchase shares when it is in
arrears on the preferred stock dividend.315  In response to Sunstates'
307. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 453 (citing HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No.
12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993); Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett
Group Inc., 463 A.2d 642, 646 (Del. Ch. 1983), aff'd474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984)).
308. In re Sunstates Corp. S'holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 533 (Del. Ch. 2001).
309. Id. at 531-32.
310. Id. at 531.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See id.
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argument, the preferred stockholders argued that because the subsidiary
corporations acted as mere agents for the parent company when they
purchased the shares, their acts should be treated as those of the parent
company.316 The preferred stockholders also argued that Sunstates violated
its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.317
Relying on principles of corporate law, the court rejected the
stockholders' agency theory.318 Specifically, "the act of one corporation is not
regarded as the act of another merely because the first corporation is a
subsidiary of the other, or because the two may be treated as part of a single
economic enterprise for some other purpose." 319 The court reasoned that the
law imposes a higher standard for in order to pierce the corporate veil based
on an agency or "alter ego" theory, the only purpose of the corporation, the
corporation being a sham, must be to commit a fraud.320
Additionally, the court failed to find a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.321 The court recognized that "the duty [arising
from the implied covenant] arises only where it is clear from what the parties
expressly agreed, that they would have proscribed the challenged conduct as a
breach of contract," emphasizing that the duty can only be relied on to find a
breach of contract in a narrow range of circumstances. 322 In this case, the
court found the parties expressly agreed, as evidenced by the certification of
incorporation, to the prohibition against share repurchases only by
Sunstates.323 Therefore, the court concluded there is no "reasonable basis to
infer that 'the parties would have proscribed' share purchases by Sunstates's
subsidiaries 'had they thought to negotiate with respect to the matter.' 324
Further, the court recognized that, under Delaware law, "special rights or
preferences of preferred stock must be expressed clearly and that nothing will
be presumed in their favor."325 Accordingly, there was no basis to infer that
parties negotiating the terms of the certificate of incorporation could have
316. Id. at 534.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. (citing Wallace v Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999).
321. Id. at 534-35.
322. Id. at 535 (alteration in original) (quoting Greytak Enters. , Inc. v. Mazda Motors of
America, Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 22-23 (Del. Ch. 1992), affd, 609 A.2d 668 (Del. 1992)).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. See also Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984)
("Stock preferences must also be clearly expressed and will not be presumed.").
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reasonably believed that the limitation of share repurchases would prohibit
the repurchase by any party other than the parent corporation.326 The
Sunstates court held that it is more reasonable to infer that negotiating parties
to the certificate of incorporation knew and understood the scope of the
limitations of the provision.327 Under Section 151(a) of the DGCL, Delaware
corporations can "issue stock having such 'special rights, and qualifications,
limitations or restrictions' relating thereto 'as shall be stated and expressed in
the certificate of incorporation or of any amendment thereto . . . ."'328
Therefore, the court recognized that under Delaware law, the special
limitations must be expressed clearly in the certificate. 329 Construing the
clause at issue strictly and recognizing that "nothing should be presumed in
[its] favor," the court concluded that the clause at issue clearly and
unambiguously applies the special limitation against share repurchases only to
Sunstates and not to its subsidiary entities.330 The court noted that nothing
prevented the certificate from prohibiting share repurchase from one of
Sunstates' subsidiary corporations, but "[i]f the special limitation had been
meant to apply to the actions of Sunstates' subsidiaries, the certificate of
incorporation could easily have said so." 331
B. Matulich v. Aegis Communications Group
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Delaware delineated the process for
properly constructing certificates of designation, and the preferred rights set
forth therein.332 This appeal, brought by a former common stockholder of
Aegis, Carlo Matulich, arose from the "Court of Chancery's interpretation of
a Certificate of Designation, which delineates the rights, preferences,
limitations and restrictions of the Series B [p]referred [s]tock." 333
The relevant facts are as follows: In 2006, World Focus made the
decision to take Aegis private by completing a short-form merger.334 When
the merger was taking place, Aegis had two classes of stock that were
326. In re Sunstates Corp. S'holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 535 (Del. Ch. 2001).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 533. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2009).
329. See In re Sunstates, 788 A.2d at 533.
330. Id. at 531 (quoting Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Del. 1990)).
331. Id. at 532.
332. Matulich v. Aegis Commc'ns Group, 942 A.2d 596, 600-01 (Del. 2008).
333. Id. at 598.
334. Id.
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outstanding, common stock and Series B preferred stock.335 World Focus
held approximately 94.84% of the Aegis outstanding common stock.336 All
but 29,778 shares of Series B preferred stock were converted into common
stock in the mid-1990s. 337 While the outstanding shares were recorded as
being in the hands of a single entity, all attempts to find the present holder of
the Series B preferred stock were unsuccessful.338 Because the Series B
preferred stock had a right to approve any merger and the identity of the
holder of the Series B preferred stock was a mystery, equitable relief would be
required to complete the merger.339 Hence, World Focus filed a petition for
equitable relief in the Delaware Chancery Court.3@ The petition sought a
declaration that the holder of the Series B preferred stock had approved and
consented to the merger, in case the holder of the outstanding Series B
preferred stock was not discovered after notice was published.341 The
Chancery Court ordered World Focus to place notices in two European
newspapers to attempt to notify the holder.342 World Focus abided by that
order, but the holder of the Series B preferred stock did not surface. 343 The
Chancery Court then entered a final order deeming the holder of the Series B
preferred stock to have approved of the merger.344 World Focus then
immediately consummated a short-form merger.345
After the merger was completed and the time period to seek appraisal
had ended, Matulich filed a complaint with the Chancery Court.346 He owned
no Series B stock, but was a former minority holder of common stock who
was angry with short-form merger consideration. 347 Matulich argued that the
Series B preferred stock, due to its right or approval and consent, had a
statutory right to vote on any merger. 348 The Chancery Court nevertheless
rejected Matulich's argument, holding instead that any statutory right to vote
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 598-99.
348. Such a right would foreclose World Focus' ability to perform a short-form merger, as it
owed less than the statutorily required proportion of series b shares. Id. at 599.
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on mergers was unambiguously denied to the holder of the Series B preferred
stock by the certificate of designation. 349 The court further held that while
the stockholders of the Series B preferred stock did not have the statutory right
to vote on any sort of merger, they did possess a contractualright to approve of
and consent to mergers.350 Consequently, Matulich's complaint was dismissed
for failure to state a claim. 351 On appeal, the issue was whether the contract
term is ambiguous when the statutory right to vote on the merger was clearly
denied in the certificate of designation simply because one party in litigation
construes its meaning differently than the other party, alleging "the provisions
of the Certificate of Designation providing a contractual right of 'approval
and consent' is legally gnonymous with the statutory right to 'vote' provided for
in the DGCL."352
The Delaware Supreme Court articulated that the starting point in
interpreting any contract is to figure out whether a provision is ambiguous.353
The court recognized contractual language "is not rendered ambiguous simply
because the parties in litigation differ concerning its meaning."354 A contract
provision is ambiguous "only when the provisions in controversy are
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or
more different meanings."355 If the term is not ambiguous, a court "must
give effect to the clear language" of the certificate of designation.3
56
With respect to mergers, the only rights given to the stockholders of the
Series B stock were the rights of approval and consent.357 Matulich argued
that the provisions of the certificate governing a contractual right of
"approval and consent" were legally synonymous with the statutory right to
"vote" provided for in the DGCL.358 The Delaware Supreme Court held that
"[s]ection b in the Certificate of Designation expressly recognizes that the
statutory right to vote being denied is different and distinct from the contractual
349. Id.
350. Id. at 598.
351. Id. at 599.
352. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
353. Id. at 600.
354. Id. (quoting City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198
(Del. 1993)).
355. Id. (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192,
1196 (Del. 1992)).
356. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 395 (Del. 1996)).
357. Id. at 601.
358. Id.
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consent and approval right that was conferred in section (A)(vi)." 359 Series B
holders were not granted a statutory voting right on mergers; however, they
were afforded with a contractual "blocking" right to stop mergers if they
declined to give their consent and approval.360 The court reaffirmed its strict
construction of the terms by stating that "[a]ny rights, preferences and
limitations of preferred stock that distinguish that stock from common stock
must be expressly and clearly stated, as provided by statute. Therefore, these
rights, preferences and limitations will not be presumed or implied."36'
Agreeing with the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the certificate of designation expressly limits the rights of the
stockholders of Series B stock by specifically refusing them any statutory
voting right, but conceding those preferred holders a contractual right of
consent and approval prior to the completion of any merger. 362 The court
recognized that, contrary to the Matulich's argument, the contractual
"blocking" right that was conferred and the statutory voting rights that were
withheld are different and therefore not "legally synonymous." 363 Even if the
preferred holders articulated their contractual right to consent and approve a
merger by voting, an exercise of that contractual right in a voting is legally
distinctive "from the statutory right to vote on the merger that was
denied." 364 Therefore, the court held that the language of certificate of
designation was not ambiguous.365 The preferred shares possessed no
statutory right to vote on mergers, but they held a contractual right to
approve and consent.366 However, the court concluded that the contractual
right to consent and approve is not equivalent to a statutory voting right on
the merger. Therefore, the Chancery Court correctly held that, since the
contractual right to consent and approve is not equivalent of a statutory right
to vote on the merger, the contractual rights of the Series B preferred holders
were immaterial "in calculating whether World Focus had the statutory voting
power necessary to execute a short-form merger."367
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. (quoting Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998)).
362. Id. at 602.
363. Id. at 601-02.
364. Id. at 602.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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C. In re Appraisal ofMetromedia International Group, Inc.
The 2009 case of In re Appraisal of Metromedia International Group, Inc.
involves an appraisal of preferred stock in a merger situation where the
preferred shares are converted into common shares under the certificate of
designation. 368 This suit was brought by the preferred shareholders, who
sought "to extract additional value for their shares through the appraisal
process even though it exceeded what the certificate defines as their right in
the event of a merger or similar transaction." 369 This litigation arose from the
merger of CaucusCom Mergerco Corp. a subsidiary of CaucusCom Ventures,
L.P. with Metromedia International Group (IG), in which MIG was the
surviving corporation. 370  During the tender offer period, CaucusCom
Mergerco Corp. purchased approximately 77.6% of MIG's outstanding
common shares, making CaucusCom Ventures, L.P., the controlling
shareholder of MIG.37R As provided in the merger agreement, the preferred
stockholders of MIG attained "the right to seek appraisal in accordance with
their rights as defined in the certificate of designation." 372
The dispute arose with regard to the construction of three provisions of
the certificate of designation relating to the value to which preferred
stockholders are entitled in the event of a merger, Sections 8 (a), (b) and
(g). 373 Section 8(a) states that each possessor of preferred stock shall have the
right, at its option, at any moment "from the [i]ssue [d]ate to convert, subject to
the terms and provisions of this Section 8, any or all of such holder's shares of
[p]referred [s]tock." 374 The rights granted in Section 8(a) are, however,
subject to section 8(g), which establishes the value to be paid to preferred
stockholders upon the occurrence of certain events.375  Section 8 (g) is
triggered by a merger and provides that the preferred shares, without the
consent of their holder, are valued as if they had been converted immediately
prior to the merger.376  Section 8(g) functions "as a non-consensual
conversion provision, treating the preferred on a merger event as though they
368. In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 896 (Del. Ch. 2009).
369. Id. at 902 n.25.
370. Id. at 895-96.
371. Id. at 898.
372. Id. at 899.
373. Id. at 901.
374. See id. at 901-04.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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have converted."377 If a merger occurs, the preferred stockholders must agree
to a conversion into common stock, which is calculated pursuant to the
certificate's formula in Section 8(a).378
MIG asserted that the maximum value of the preferred stockholder
shares is "based on the preferred's being converted into common shares
under the certificate of designation." 379 Pursuant to IG's assertions, the
certificate of designation forced limitations on the $18.07 per preferred share
consideration that preferred stockholders would obtain upon conversion.380
Alternatively, petitioners relied on "three different valuation approaches,
which yield a range of values from $67.50 per share to $79.76 per share." 381
Therefore, the most significant question in this appraisal action was whether
the certificate of designation contractually sets up the metric for valuing the
preferred stockholder shares if a merger takes place.382 The court held that it
did, which caused many of the underlying disputes among the testifying
experts over the competing valuation models to be effectively rendered
irrelevant.383 Basically, the issue before the court was whether the preferred
stockholders can "seek to extract additional value for their shares through the
appraisal process even though it exceeds what the certificate defines as their
right in the event of a merger or similar transaction." 384
Chancellor Allen analyzed the rights bestowed upon preferred holders by
the certificate of designation because "[t]o the extent it possesses any special
rights or powers and to the extent it is restricted or limited in any way, the
relation between the holder of the preferred and the corporation is
contractual."385 When determining the fair value of preferred stock, the court
must first analyze the contract from which the preferred stock's derives its
value.386 Basically, "the valuation of preferred stock must be viewed through
the defining lens of its certificate of designation, unless the certificate is
ambiguous or conflicts with positive law."387 The court first addressed the
377. Id. at 903.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 896.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 900.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 902 n.25.
385. Id. at 900 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred
Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 977 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
386. Id.
387. Id.
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validity of the contract, noting that under Delaware law, "a valid contract will
be enforced unless the contract violates public policy or positive law, or
unless a party's non-performance is excused."388 The court held that because
of the contractual nature of preferred stock, a clear contractual provision that
sets forth the value of preferred stock if a cash-out merger occurs does not
conflict with section 262 of the DGCL.389
Then the court analyzed whether the contract was ambiguous. 390 The
court held that "preferred shares are entitled to the value determined under
the terms of their constitutive contract-unless ambiguity in the contract
compels the Court to employ alternative valuation constructs to determine
fair value."391 No ambiguity existed concerning the value to be paid to the
preferred stockholders in the event they are made to have their shares
converted when a merger occurs. 392 As a result, the court held that MIG's
certificate of designation clearly and unambiguously defined the value
preferred stockholders are entitled to when a merger takes place. 393 The
rights of preferred stockholders were clearly defined and they were provided
with "fair value" to which they were legally entitled.394 Therefore, the court
concluded that since the rights of preferred shareholders in the event of a
merger are clearly stated in the certificate of designation, those shareholders
cannot bring a suit "seeking additional consideration in the merger through
the appraisal process" by insisting that there are alternative value-adding
provisions in the certificate of designation. 395
D. Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corporation
According to Professor Oesterle, the Delaware Supreme Court
performed damage control in ElioU Assoiates, LP. v. Avatex Cwp. in order to
reassure those surprised by their strict construction of boilerplate language. 396
388. Id. (citing In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 977 (Del.
Ch. 1997)).
389. Id. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2009).
390. See In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 901-02 (Del. Ch.
2009).
391. Id. at 902 n.25 (citing In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d
973, 975 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 901.
394. Id. at 902-03 n.25.
395. Id. at 907.
396. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998). See DALE ARTHUR
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Commentators have noted that Avatex is different from the court's other
cases that demonstrate the court's tendency for strict construction because
the Avatex court considered the intentions of the drafters, even though it
made it apparent that the rights of preferred must be expressly stated and
"will not be presumed or implied."397
Plaintiffs in this case were preferred holders of defendant Avatex
Corporation.398 Avatex incorporated Xetava Corporation as its wholly owned
subsidiary and the following day announced it would merge itself into Xetava,
with Xetava becoming the surviving corporation.399 Immediately after the
transaction was completed, Xetava would change its name to Avatex. 400
According to the proposed merger, the preferred stock of Avatex would be
converted into common stock of Xetava.401 Since the conversion would
eliminate Avatex's certification of incorporation, which provided rights and
preferences for the Avatex preferred stockholders, plaintiffs brought suit in
the Chancery Court to enjoin the merger.402 They argued that in order for the
transaction to get started, there must be consent of two-thirds of the holders
of the first series preferred stock.403 Granting the defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the Chancery Court found that the provisions in
question did not require any consent.404 The stockholders then appealed this
ruling.405 The text of the terms governing the voting right of the first series
preferred stock was set forth in the certificate of designations and states as
follows:
Except as expressly provided hereinafter in this [s]ection (6) or as
otherwise ... required by law, the First Series Preferred Stock
shall have no voting rights.... So long as any shares of First
Series Preferred Stock remain outstanding, the consent of the
holders of at least two-thirds of the shares of the First Series
Preferred Stock outstanding at the time (voting separately as a
OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONs 89 (Thompson West 3d ed. 2005).
397. EliottAssocs., LP., 715 A.2d at 852-53 (citing Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc.,
474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984); Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134-35 (Del. 1990)).
398. Id. at 844.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 844-45.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See id. at 845.
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class .. .) ... shall be necessary to permit, effect or validate any
one or more of the following:
(b) The amendment, altercation or repeal, whether by merger,
consolidation or otherwise, of any of the provisions of the
Restated Certificate of Incorporation or of [the certificate of
designations] which would materially and adversely affect any
right, preference, privilege or voting power of the First Series
Preferred Stock or of the holders thereof ... .406
The court recognized that under Delaware law, corporations are
permitted to create and issue stock denying voting rights. 407 The Avatex
certificate of incorporation provided that, with the exception of matters set
forth in the certificate or required by law, Avatex preferred shares had no
right to vote.408 One such exception applies in the situation where any
"amendment, altercation or repeal" of the certificate "whether by merger,
consolidation or otherwise . .. [would] materially and adversely" affect the
rights of the preferred stockholders. 409 In such event, there must be consent
of two-thirds of the preferred holders voting as a class. 410
Under the certificate, the requirements for the events triggering voting
rights would be divided into three parts: (1) whether the events amount to
"amendment, alteration or repeal" of the certificate of incorporation, (2)
whether the "amendment, alteration or appeal" of the certificate of
incorporation was effected "by merger, consolidation or otherwise," and (3)
whether such events would "materially and adversely affect the rights of the
[preferred] stockholders." 411 In light of the first requirement, the Court
ascertained that the terms of the proposed merger showed that Xetava would
be the surviving corporation and thus Avatex's disappearance gave rise to the
legal nullity of its certificate. 412 Given that the certificate's conversion to legal
nullity constitutes "repeal," the Court held that the proposed merger
potentially fell within the category of those events that would trigger
406. Id. (emphasis omitted).
407. Id. at 846.
408. Id. at 847.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. See id. at 845.
412. Id. at 851.
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preferred voting rights.413 As for the third requirement, the court held that
because the merger rendered the certificate, and so the protection provided to
the preferred therein, a legal nullity, it certainly caused an adverse effect.414
Since the first and the third requirements could be met easily, the dispute
revolved around the second requirement of whether "merger, consolidation
or otherwise" was the cause of an "amendment, alteration or repeal."
According to Section 251 of the DGCL, there are three ways that a
merger or consolidation can affect the certificate:
(1) Section 251 (b)(3) Amendments. First, the merger agreement may
call for amendments to the pre-existing certificate of the
surviving corporation. (2) Displacement and Substitution by Merger.
Second, the merger can designate the certificate of one of the
constituent corporations as the certificate of the surviving entity,
and thereby render the certificate of every other constituent
corporation a legal nullity. (3) Displacement and Substitution via
Consolidation. Finally, in the case of a consolidation, the certificate
of the resulting corporation displaces and renders a legal nullity
the certificate of every disappearing constituent corporation.415
Avatex argued that only a Section 251(b)(3) amendment could be the
cause of an "amendment, alteration or repeal" under the provisions defining
the voting rights of the preferred stockholders. 416 However, according to
Avatex, this provision would apply only when Avatex was the surviving
company of the merger (and amendment of the certificate was made
accordingly), since the provision requires the continued existence of a pre-
existing certificate of the surviving corporation.417  Therefore, Avatex's
argument was that since it will disappear along with its certificate after the
proposed merger, amendment to that certificate is not contemplated;
therefore, Section 251(b)(3) cannot be applied to the proposed merger. 418
However, the court pointed out that the protection in the certificate was
provided in a consolidation situation where Section 251(b)(3) will not
413. Id.
414. Id. at 852.
415. Id. at 850 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(3)-(4), (e) (2009)).
416. Id. at 850-51.
417. Id. at 851.
418. See id. at 854.
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apply.419 Therefore, the court held that if the protections are to be confined
to Section 251(b)(3), the word "consolidation" in the certificate becomes
meaningless, which violates the established rule that, all terms of the
instrument being read as a whole, all provisions of it must be reconciled to
the extent possible.420
While the court emphasized the fact that Section 6 of the certificate
includes the word "consolidation," it acknowledged that the transaction in
question was not a consolidation.421 However, the court seemed to find the
fact that Avatex and its certificate in question would simply disappear
analogous to a consolidation, where the protection would be provided.422 For
that reason, the preferred should be provided with the analogous protection
provided in the context of consolidation. 423  Therefore, considering the
drafters' use of the word "consolidation," the court held that contracting
parties' intent must have been that, although the certificate would disappear
with the Avatex, the preferred holders would still be granted protections in
the certificate. The preferred would thereby have the right to vote at least in
some transactions, including a merger that would cause Avatex to
disappear.424 In reversing the judgment of the Chancery Court, the Delaware
Supreme Court held in favor of the plaintiff-the preferred stockholders. 425
It should be noted that, although the Court looked at the intent of the
contracting parties, the Court made it clear that the "rights, preferences and
limitations of preferred stock ... must be expressly and clearly stated ....
[and] will not be presumed or implied."426 The Court concluded that the
rights of the preferred are expressly and clearly stated in the Avatex
certificate. 427
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 851.
422. See id.
423. See id. at 851.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 855.
426. Id. at 852-53 (citing Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del.
1984); Waggoner v Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134-35 (Del. 1990)).
427. Id. at 853.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As previously explained, the Jedwab court held, "where however the right
asserted is not a preference as against the common stock but rather a right
shared equally with the common," fiduciary duties should be owed by
directors to the preferred.428 In 2009, although the Trados court explicitly
stated the situation before the court was not the Jedwab situation, it
acknowledged the Jedwab rule as a valid law.429 Also, as recently as 2010, the
LC Capital court also recognized the Jedwab rule as a valid law, but determined
that the Jedwab rule was not applicable to the situation in question because the
preferred right was plainly provided in the certificate.430 Given that those
cases were decided very recently, despite Professor Bainbridge's criticism of
the Jedwab decision that Jedwab rule should be treated as a violation of the
general rule,431 it appears that the Jedwab rule still remains good law. Also, it is
notable that Professor Mitchell maintained that if the relationship of the
preferred stockholders to the directors and the common seems to have been
clarified by several decisions, that apparent clarity is an illusion.432 However,
as far as the court is concerned, its position seems to be consistent.
Even though Jedwab rule is considered to be still in effect, there remains a
question of whether the preferred can be provided with enough protection.
In connection with the protection of the rights of the preferred stockholder,
Professor Mitchell suggests that the preferred stockholder should consider
their contract as the exclusive source of their rights and they should not
consider themselves as stockholders at all.433 Considering his opinion with
regard to the Jedwab decision that, the preferred and the common being
similar as participants in a corporation, the directors should owe some
fiduciary duties to the preferred,434 his statement sounds contradictory to his
opinion regarding Jedwab. However, as a reason for his seemingly
contradictory statement, he advances awareness of the reality that the
preferred cannot be protected from being put in a vulnerable position.435 It is
428. Jedwab v MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
429. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jul. 24,
2009).
430. See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 446-47 (Del. Ch. 2010).
431. Bainbridge, supra note 161.
432. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 444.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 472.
435. See id. at 444.
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because most preferred stock is structured in a manner that the corporation is
never obligated to redeem it and thus return equity.436 Thus, the preferred
stockholders will be left not being able to realize any value from the
enterprise.437  Therefore, Professor Mitchell seems to emphasize with his
statement that the preferred stockholders must protect themselves by
defining their rights in the contract carefully. In fact, as an alternative, in
order to provide the preferred ultimate protection, a law has been suggested
to be put in place to explicitly impose some kind of duty on corporate
directors in favor of preferred stockholders. 438 However, since it may not
take place soon,439 it will not be helpful either.
The contract itself being important as a source of preferred rights, the
preferred should be encouraged to protect their rights by following what the
general rule implicitly instructs, which is to have their rights articulated in the
contract. Courts have been recognizing this general rule clearly and
consistently.40 Therefore, when defining preferred rights in the contract, the
preferred stockholders must remember that courts strictly construe the terms,
looking at whether the rights of the preferred are expressly stated in the
contract.441 This approach has been affirmed by recent decisions, such as
Matulich in 2008 and In re Appraisal of Metromedia International Group, Inc in 2009,
respectively. Therefore, the preferred stockholders should be very careful in
having their rights carefully designated in the contract.
Given those cases with respect to the preferred rights including recent
Trados case, the question of what role the lawyers should perform to protect
the preferred stockholder clients arises.
First, considering the Delaware Court's tendency for strict construction
of contract terms, when negotiating the initial contract the lawyers should
remind their prospective preferred shareholder clients to pay more attention
as to the way the preferred rights will be defined in the contract-if they have
opportunity to negotiate it.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 476.
439. Id.
440. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Jul. 24, 2009); LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 445-46 (Del. Ch.
2010).
441. See Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984); In re
Sunstates Corp. S'holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 536 (Del. Ch. 2001).
5:377 (2011)430
Preferred Stockholder Rights
Second, as a consequence of the strong impact the Trados case has made
on lawyers since the decision was rendered, "careful process" has become a
matter whose significance cannot be over-emphasized. That is, as Trados
instructs, lawyers should advise their preferred stockholder clients to check
whether there was a careful process, such as the "retention of expert advisers
or the formation of independent committees,"442 and whether it continued to
exist "at every stage in the planning of a ... transaction" favoring the
preferred over the common. 443 It would help the directors to prove fairness
of the entire transaction favoring the preferred stockholders and thereby the
interests of the preferred stockholders can be protected. Therefore, those
lawyers who advise preferred clients must make sure there was such "careful
process" during the course of the transaction. Especially when private-equity
sponsors and venture capital funds, as preferred stockholders, could place
their employees on company boards, lawyers should advise the preferred
stockholder clients to make such directors arrange for the careful process to
be put in place, just in case a suit is brought by the common.444 Otherwise,
because of the fact that the preferred has placed their employees on company
boards, it will be more difficult for directors to prove the entire fairness of the
transaction favoring the preferred.
442. Savitt, supra note 5, at 78.
443. Id.
444. Id.
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